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Abstract 
With the advent of new media technologies and approaches in the twentieth century, public 
health officials became convinced that health needed mass media support. The World Health 
Organization believed that educating people, as well as informing them about the health situation 
around the world, could assist the enduring fight against disease. Yet in an increasingly 
competitive media landscape, the agency recognised the need to persuade people and hold their 
attention through attractive presentation. Public information, the name given to the multiple 
strategies used to communicate with the public, was rarely straightforward and required the 
agency not only to monitor the impact of its own efforts but also to identify opportunities to 
further enhance its reputation, especially when this was in danger of damage or 
PLVDSSURSULDWLRQ7KH:+2¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQprovides insights into the 
development of international information, communication and education networks and practices 
after 1945, as well as the increasingly central position of these processes in generating support 
for and evincing the value of international organisations. 
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In the summer of 1956 the World Health Organization (WHO) considered an intriguing 
proposal from George Englund, a producer and partner in a small Hollywood film company 
called Pennebaker Productions. Englund sought to produce a feature film for a popular audience 
based on the technical assistance activities of the United Nations (UN) and its Specialized 
Agencies. His interest in international technical assistance had been stimulated some two years 
previously, after witnessing the work of the WHO and the UN in South Asia. Afterwards he met 
with WHO officials to make his case, and by 1956 his team was eager to take the project to the 
next stage. On the face of it this was not an unusual request for support. By that time the WHO 
had worked with numerous film and television companies, photographers, and radio producers to 
document the WHO¶Vactivities. But what marked this proposal out was the other name in the 
picture. Pennebaker was a small studio which traded on the reputation of its only star and part 
owner, Marlon Brando, the leading man of box office successes such as The Wild One (1953) 
and On The Waterfront (1954). Brando too was absorbed by the work of the UN, and saw it as 
the perfect theme for a high drama extravaganza, with South Asia providing the exotic 
backdrop.1 
Officials throughout the different sections of the WHO and the UN were both enticed by 
and apprehensive about the idea. It was felt that Pennebaker¶VSLWFKZDVSHUVXDVLYHHQRXJK
                                                 
1
 WHO Archives. General Aspects of Film Production, Policy, Distribution, V6/158/1. Brando Film Group 
Correspondence. 
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Brando, Englund and their writer, Stewart Stern, had all impressed as individuals who were 
LQWHOOLJHQWO\DQGHDUQHVWO\LQWHUHVWHGLQGHYHORSLQJWKHILOP3ULRUWR%UDQGR¶VVFKHGXOHGILOP
work in Japan, the group had reconnoitred a number of countries where technical assistance 
programmes were underway. Furthermore, it was noted that there was little preventing 
Pennebaker or indeed anyone else from making a film inspired by the UN. However, official 
backing was a different matter. From here the project began to falter, largely because of the 
fundamental need to protect the identity and integrity of UN agencies. Whilst a high-profile film 
might have served the WHO well in making its mission and work known on a grander scale and 
to new audiences, it also had the potential to harm the DJHQF\¶V reputation. The Pennebaker 
group was advised WKDWµXQGXHDQGKLJKO\-FRORXUHG¶SXEOLFLW\RIWKHLUDFWLYLWLHVLQFRXQWU\ZRXOG
be undesirable, and that they should be sensitive to the cautious attitude which UN officers had 
WRSUHVHQWLQWKHILHOG7KH:+2¶V'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO, Dr Marcolino Candau, ZDUQHGWKDWµDQ\
misconceptions which might be fostered by such a film would be harmful, whether a particular 
agency was mentioned or nRW¶2 Ultimately the project went no further within the UN, and in July 
1959 Brando was still searching for the right script.3 Pennebaker eventually released a version of 
WKHILOPLQDVµ7KH8JO\$PHULFDQ¶EDVHGRQWKHEHVWVHOOLQJQRYHOE\(XJene 
Burdick and William Lederer. In this version, Brando played Harrison MacWhite, United States 
ambassador to Sarkan, a fictional Southeast Asian nation on the brink of civil war.4  
The coming together of the WHO and Marlon Brando, albeit a minor footnote in the 
history of the silver screen, has wider significance with regard to the attempts made by 
                                                 
2
 WHO Archives, General Aspects of Film Production, Policy, Distribution, V 6/158/1, 8 March 1956, Brando Film 
Group Letter. 
3
 µ0DUORQ%UDQGRZDQWVWRPDNHILOPRQ81¶Sarasota Journal, 22nd July 1959. 
4
 %RVOH\&URZWKHU
´7KH8JO\$PHULFDQ´RSHQV0DUORQ%UDQGRVWDUVDVWKH86GLSORPDW¶The New York Times, 
12th April 1963: http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9403E7DD103CE63ABC4A52DFB2668388679EDE 
(consulted 20 October 2017). 
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international organizations to communicate their existence and represent their work to different 
audiences around the world. µPublic information¶ was the term given to the different materials 
and strategies, including popular films, used by such organizations to raise awareness and foster 
understanding of their role, as well as to mould public sentiment. This could not be achieved 
simply by producing and disseminating information; publicity officers were often required to 
creatively frame µinformation¶ in exciting, touching and memorable ways. This article examines 
this machine, exploring what the WHO understood by public information and what it intended it 
to do; how campaigns were structured and managed in light of contemporary tensions about the 
use of propaganda; and how these strategies were evaluated. It will discuss how the agency 
managed its image, as well as how it safeguarded its brand and reputation. The WHO example is 
illustrative of the complex process of representation in which international organisations were 
engaged.  These campaigns required judicious use of information and persuasion to target 
audiences who did not consume material uncritically and were increasingly suspicious of the 
motives behind official communications.  
The article ILQGVWKDWWKH:+2¶VSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQZRUNKDGGLIIHUHQWEXWUHODWHG
purposes. The first was to assist in developing an informed public opinion among all peoples on 
matters of health, on the basis that the public could not be expected to give support without 
accurate information regarding the problems that the WHO tackled. The second function was to 
rouse and satisfy a general interest in the WHO and its work, which went beyond disseminating 
information to showing the agency in a positive light. These two goals overlapped and merged, 
and together display a different facet to international health in this period, revealing attitudes that 
wavered between providing health education and prioritising public relations. 
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The Second World War compelled governments to organize mass media campaigns to 
keep citizens informed about and loyal to the war effort. However, the rise of false and 
manipulative propaganda tarnished what had once been a neutral term and tainted the image of 
public information. As such, whilst it became a significant component in the UN¶V postwar drive 
for international peace and cooperation, the specifics of operation and intentions in public 
information campaigns were obscured. 0DUN$OOH\QH¶VGHWDLOHGKLVWRU\RIWKH81¶VSXEOLF
information work throughout the second half of the twentieth century notes a constant tension: 
although the role of public information was to counter the threat of misinformation and 
destructive propaganda, the organisation was equally concerned that its own efforts would be 
construed as propaganda, thereby damaging its international reputation.5  
On the other hand, many RIWKHFDPSDLJQVUHOHDVHGE\WKH81¶VVSHFLDOLVHGDJHQFLHV
were designed to persuade and influence rather than soberly inform, epitomised by the growing 
centrality of visual appeals. Tom Allbeson and Zoë Druick demonstrate how the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) embraced visual media strategies 
as a way to overcome national boundaries, inculcate mutual understanding, and garner support 
for the aJHQF\¶VZRUN.6 UNESCO sought WRIDFLOLWDWHDµULJKW¶ZD\RIORRNLQJDWWKHZRUOGDQGLWV
problems,7 and inspire a sense of obligation through, for instance, photographs of children. The 
extensive photograph campaigns of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) similarly 
focussed on recognisable and emotional tropes, such as alternatively harrowing and uplifting 
photographs of mothers with children, to construct a visual vocabulary of  µKXQJHU¶DQGµQHHG¶
                                                 
5
 Mark Alleyne, Global lies?: propaganda, the UN, and world order, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 23. 
6
 7RP$OOEHVRQµ3KRWRJUDSKLFGLSORPDF\LQWKHSRVWZDUZRUOG81(6&2DQGWKHFRQFHSWLRQRISKRWRJUDSK\DVD
universal language, 1946-¶Modern Intellectual History, 12, 2, 2015, pp. 389-415; Zoë DUXLFNµ81(6&2ILOP
DQGHGXFDWLRQPHGLDWLQJSRVWZDUSDUDGLJPVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶LQ&KDUOHV$FODQGDQG+DLGHH:DVVRQHGV
Useful cinema, Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 
7
 $OOEHVRQµ3KRWRJUDSKLFGLSORPDF\LQWKHSRVWZDUZRUOG¶S 
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which was used to generate support and donations for its mission.8  UNICEF convened large-
scale public relations campaigns in the United StatesLQFOXGLQJµWULFNRUWUHDWIRUUNICEF¶, and 
used celebrities such as Danny Kaye and Peter Ustinov as goodwill ambassadors.9 Although it is 
difficult to judge the precise nature of the impact, these high-profile campaigns probably played 
a significant role in influencing how people around the world perceived certain issues, countries 
and peoples in ways that went beyond an awareness of their plight and needs. 
Official histories of the WHO confirm not only the importance of public information, but 
also the rich diversity of materials and strategies used to shape popular attitudes towards illness 
and disease, which included cartoons, radio series, exhibitions, and world health observation 
days.10 As the most popular leisure pursuit in the immediate postwar years, film was 
exceptionally important, and Kirsten Ostherr has examined a number of WHO films to determine 
how they influenced popular understandings about the global spread of disease.11 The era also 
witnessed the unprecedented popularity of weekly photo magazines: Hansen argues that, before 
the mass availability of television, Life magazine was instrumental in creating visual archetypes 
of nurses and medical researchers, which became so familiar to the public eye that they took on 
the status of icons.12 The WHO published its own illustrated magazines that mirrored the style of 
Life, and the DJHQF\¶Vpublished and unpublished photography includes a truly vast range of 
                                                 
8
 Laura BULJJVµ0RWKHUFKLOGUDFHQDWLRQWKHYLVXDOLFRQRJUDSK\RIUHVFXHDQGWKHSROLWLFVRIWUDQVQDWLRQDODQG
WUDQVUDFLDODGRSWLRQ¶Gender and History, 15, 2, 2003, pp. 191-93. 
9
 Randall Packard, A history of global health: interventions into the lives of other peoples, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2016, pp. 125-27. 
10
 WHO, The first ten years of the World Health Organization, Geneva: WHO, 1958; WHO, The second ten years of 
the World Health Organization, Geneva: WHO, 1968; Socrates Litsios, The third ten years of the World Health 
Organization, Geneva: WHO, 2008; WHO, The fourth ten years of the World Health Organization, Geneva: WHO, 
2011. 
11
 .LUVWHQ2VWKHUUµ&RQWDJLRQDQGWKHERXQGDULHVRIWKHYLVLEOHWKHFLQHPDRIZRUOGKHDOWK¶Camera Obscura, 17, 
2, 2002, pp. 1-38; Kirsten Ostherr, Cinematic prophylaxis: globalization and contagion in the discourse of world 
health, Durham: Duke University Press, 2005. 
12
 Bert Hansen, Picturing medical progress from Pasteur to polio: a history of mass media, New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 2009, p. 208. 
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stories, countries and photographers, including archival files for over eight hundred photo 
missions conducted between 1953 and 1989.  
Thomas David and Davide Rodogno have led the way in opening up the WHO extensive 
photographic legacy to scrutiny. They have revealed information about the nature of 
collaborations with outside agents such as the celebrated Magnum photo agency, and identified 
particular narratives in the DJHQF\¶V work up to the late-1960s.13 They argue that the WHO relied 
on SKRWRJUDSKVWRFRQVWUXFWµEHIRUHDQGDIWHU¶QDUUDWLYHVZKLFKSUHFLVHO\GHPRQVWUDWHGWKH
efficacy of medical interventions and by extension the important work of the WHO. Photo 
stories also drew upon recognisable and understandable themes about development, progression, 
centred on a cast of villains, victims and saviours.14 These narratives enabled the WHO to give 
its technical assistance work a human face, allowing it to portray incontrovertible proof of its 
success and thereby enhancing its authority.  
$OWKRXJKILOPVDQGSKRWRJUDSKLFFDPSDLJQVZHUHFHQWUDOSLOODUVRIWKH:+2¶V
communications, they were part of a larger public information machine set up to inform the 
µJUHDWHVWQXPEHURISHRSOHZLWKLQWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFDERXWWKH2UJDQL]DWLRQ¶VZRUNDQGDbout 
KHDOWKPDWWHUVPRUHJHQHUDOO\¶15 This article builds on the work of David and Rodogno in a 
number of key areas. ,WUHFRQVWUXFWVWKHDJHQF\¶VDWWLWXGHWRDQGGHYHORSPHQWRISXEOLF
information campaigns DFURVVURXJKO\WKHILUVWWZRGHFDGHVRI:+2¶VRSHUation until the 1970s, 
and shows KRZWKLVLPSDFWHGRQWKHGHVLJQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKH:+2¶VPDJD]LQHVIt locates 
the DJHQF\¶Vphotographic output within this public information context to add information 
                                                 
13
 7KRPDV'DYLGDQG'DYLGH5RGRJQRµ$OOWKHZRUOGORYHVDSLFWXUHWKH:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ
VYLVXDO
politics, 1948±¶LQ+HLGH)HKUHQEDFKDQG'DYLGH5RGRJQRHGVHumanitarian photography: a history, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 223-48. 
14
 'DYLGDQG5RGRJQRµ$OOWKHZRUOGORYHVDSLFWXUH¶SS-42. 
15
 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United 
Nations, 1950, WHO: Geneva, 1951, p. 71. http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85609 (consulted 20 October 
2017).. 
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regarding how certain visual narratives were built up and propounded. A key strategy in relation 
to photographs was to distribute them as widely as possible, and this article therefore examines 
the mechanisms used to do this, the consequent reach of the images, and their afterlife beyond 
the WHO. Unpublished notes and contact sheets from photographic missions in conjunction with 
published variants demonstrate that despite its appreciated capacity to provide an accurate 
pictorial record, photography was used primarily emotionally in order to sensitise the public to 
issues that WHO thought important. Photography therefore represents a key way to a better 
understanding of how the WHO approached its public information work. However, this was not 
without its problems: the discussion surrounding the Brando film project is just one high-profile 
instance that GHPRQVWUDWHVWKH:+2¶VHDUO\LQWHUHVWLQSURMHFWVZKLFKHPEUDFHGSRSXODUYLVXDO
culture as a means to propagate messages about science, health and development, but was also 
anxious to control the nature of such messages.  
The rise of public information 
The beginning of international cooperation in the field of health is commonly traced to 
the organisation of the Sanitary Conferences, the first of which was held in 1851. However, by 
the late nineteenth century the tide of opinion held that a permanent regulatory body would be 
better placed to oversee matters in the long term. An International Sanitary Bureau was 
subsequently IRUPHGLQIROORZHGE\WKH2IILFH,QWHUQDWLRQDOG¶+\JLHQH3XEOLTXHin 
1907.16 After the First World War, the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) was 
given a broad remit to prevent and control the spread of disease, and examine health problems 
relating to nutrition, housing and rural hygiene. The LNHO operated with mixed success 
throughout the interwar years, and its work was all but halted during the Second World War. In 
                                                 
16
 Iris Borowy, Coming to terms with world health: the League of Nations Health Organization, 1921±1946, Oxford: 
Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 12-13 & 26-29; John Farley, Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold 
War, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008, p. 10. 
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April 1945, the allied nations assembled at the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization to debate the maintenance of peace and security through international cooperation 
on economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems. However, these discussions did not at 
first envisage an agency specialising in health. This omission prompted the Brazilian and 
Chinese delegations to propose the amalgamation of existing health organizations into one 
specialised agency, recognising that health was a fundamental pillar of international peace and 
security and should be formally acknowledged as such.17 Ultimately agreeing upon the value of 
such an agency, the International Health Conference was convened in New York between June 
and July 1946 to draft the constitution of the WHO and arrange an Interim Commission to 
preside over health matters until the agency was established. The constitution came into force on 
7 April 1948. That GDWHZRXOGKHQFHIRUWKEHNQRZQDVµ:RUOG+HDOWK'D\¶WRFRPPHPRUDWHWKH
DJHQF\¶VIRUPDWLRQDQGdirect international attention towards urgent health problems. As well as 
a central headquarters at the Palais de Nations in Geneva, regional offices were established in 
Africa, the Americas, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Western 
Pacific.18 
7KH:+2¶VUROHZDVWRSURYLGHWHFKQLFDODVVLVWDQFHWR8N member states, meaning that 
it would not intervene directly but work with governments to develop efficient health services, 
monitor outbreaks of disease, promote health education, and coordinate research. Its constitution 
proclaimed good health to be the right of every human regardless of race, religion, political 
belief, economic or social condition, and defined health ambitiously as a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. 
However, from the very start opinion was divided over how this could and should be achieved. 
                                                 
17
 Farley, Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold War, p. 10. 
18
 For more on the history and operation of regional offices see Kelley Lee, The World Health Organization, 
London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 30-34. 
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7KH:+2¶VILUVW'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO, Brock Chisholm, together with key ILJXUHVLQWKH:+2¶V
formation such as René Sand, Andrija Stampar and Karl Evang, was a proponent of social 
medicine, which advocated a slower, holistic approach to health linked to broader 
development.19 Yet the Second World War KDGGHOLYHUHGQHZµZHDSRQV¶ in the fight against 
disease, in the form of antibiotics, vaccines and insecticides, which promised quick resolutions. 
 This tension between the targeted, rapid interventions and the more measured and 
extensive social medicine approach was heightened by Cold War suspicions: whilst the Soviet 
Union favoured social medicine, it was distrusted by the United States, which insisted that 
vertical programmes and rapid-action projects provided the best chance of success. The United 
States also believed that the impressive new medical weapons could be used to counter the 
spread of Communism by winning the hearts and minds of countries facing engrained health 
problems.20 When the Soviet Union and the communist nations in its sphere of influence 
boycotted the UN system in 1949 (returning in 1956), the United States became freer to 
LQIOXHQFHWKH:+2¶VZRUNSULRULties.21 Disease eradication campaigns against malaria, 
tuberculosis and venereal diseases became prominent and well-FRYHUHGLQLWLDWLYHVLQ:+2¶V
arsenal. 
 Although prominent, it was felt that the success of the WHO should not depend only on 
such programmes, and tKHDJHQF\¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQFDOOHGIRUWKHdevelopment of informed opinion 
on matters of health.22 The envisioned audience was not just medical and public health 
professionals but all mankind. %URFN&KLVKROPVSRNHRIKLVGHVLUHWRLQVWLODµZRUOGKHDOWK
                                                 
19
 Farley, Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold War, p. 111. 
20
 Ibid, pp. 116-117. 
21
 Theodore Brown, 0DUFRV&XHWRDQG(OL]DEHWK)HHµ7KH:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQDQGWKHWUDQVLWLRQIURP
³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´WR³JOREDO´SXEOLFKHDOWK¶The American Journal of Public Health, 96, 1, 2006, p. 65. 
22
 Article 2(r) of the WHO constitution. 
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consciRXVQHVV¶23 Becoming operational in September 1948, the WHO Public Information Office 
(PIO) was tasked with helping to achieve this by presenting and interpreting the activities of the 
agency for the public. Its role was to ensure the readability and uniformity of style of 
publications; disseminate the findings of technical divisions; satisfy requests for information 
from publicity media and international, governmental, professional and civic organizations; and 
help combat sensationalist reporting and misinformation on health matters.24  
By this time public information was of acknowledged importance, explaining why a 
GHGLFDWHGRIILFHZDVIRUPHGVRHDUO\LQ:+2¶VKLVWRU\In the early years of the twentieth 
century, new psychological theories about how to influence public attitudes raised the profile of 
public information. The burgeoning mass media environment afforded greater opportunity to 
influence public opinion, but also meant that organisations competed for attention and support in 
an increasingly crowded marketplace. Francesca Piana shows that, facing competition in the 
humanitarian realm, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) established a 
Propaganda Commission in 1919 to advertise its activities through photographs and film. Such 
cDPSDLJQVSURYLGHGHYLGHQFHRIWKH,&5&¶VZRUN\HWVRXJKWWRdraw audiences to its cause by 
displaying unequivocally the plight of suffering and rescued peoples.25 During the interwar 
years, the Save the Children fund spent five per cent of its annual income on advertising in 
national broadsheets and radio broadcasts, and published a bi-monthly magazine titled The 
:RUOG¶V&KLOGUHQ.26 High-ranking figures in the League of Nations stressed that µthe public all 
over the world will have to be taught to think internationally, to look at public affairs, not merely 
                                                 
23
 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United 
Nations, 1951, WHO: Geneva, 1952, p. 1. http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85637(consulted 20 October 2017). 
24
 WH2,QWHULP&RPPLVVLRQµ:RUOG+HDOWK2UJDQL]DWLRQ3XEOLF,QIRUPDWLRQ¶:+2,& 
25
 )UDQFHVFD3LDQDµ3KRWRJUDSK\FLQHPDDQGWKHTXHVWIRULQIOXHQFHWKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RPPLWWHHRIWKH5HG&URVV
LQWKHZDNHRIWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DU¶LQ+HLGH)HKUHQEDFKDQG'DYLGH5RGRJQRHGVHumanitarian Photography: 
A History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 144-56. 
26
 (PLO\%DXJKDQµ³(YHU\FLWL]HQRI(PSLUHLPSORUHGWRVDYHWKH&KLOGUHQ´(PSLUHLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVPDQGWKH6DYH
the Children Fund in inter-ZDU%ULWDLQ¶Historical Research, 86, 231, 2013, pp. 123-24. 
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from the sectional national point of view, but also from a broad human international point of 
YLHZ¶27 Tworek shows that, for the League, public information strategies represented a key tool 
to counteract the spread of false information, encourage international cooperation, and assist the 
µPRUDOGLVDUPDPHQW¶RIDOOQDWLRQV 
However, the WHO PIO was inaugurated at a time of heightened suspicion surrounding 
public information. As Wollaneger points out, before the Second World War µSURSDJDQGD¶ZDV
often used in a neutral sense in relation to advertising, but during the conflict it became linked to 
more sinister motives of deception and coercion.28 Yet, ZKLOVWWHUPVVXFKDVµLQIRUPDWLRQ¶
µSURSDJDQGD¶DQGµSXEOLFLW\¶FRQWLQXHGWREHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\EHKLQGFORVHGGRRUVWKHwar 
alerted the public to the potential dishonesty of information.29 Alleyne¶VZRUN demonstrates that 
whilst the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) was formed in 1946 to inform and 
educate citizens about global problems and priorities, and sensitise them to the benefits of mutual 
understanding and collaboration, it was equally concerned about accusations of µpropaganda¶.30 
([SODLQLQJWKH'HSDUWPHQW¶VIXQFWLRQVLQThe Public Opinion Quarterly, Benjamin Cohen, the 
first Assistant Secretary General in charge of the DPI, noted WKDWLWZRXOGµFROOHFWFROODWHDQG
JLYHRXWIDFWXDOLQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVRQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOEDVLV¶, but stated 
categorically that LWZDVµQRWDSURSDJDQGDDJHQF\¶.31  
In line with the common information policy envisaged by the UN and its specialised 
agencies,32 the WHO similarly GHPDQGHGWKDWDOOLWVLQIRUPDWLRQVKRXOGEHµSUHVHQWHGLQDQ
                                                 
27
 +HLGL7ZRUHNµ3HDFHWKURXJKWUXWK"WKHSUHVVDQGPRUDOGLVDUPDPHQWWKURXJKWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV¶Medien & 
Zeit, 25, 4, 2010, pp. 16-23. 
28
 Mark Wollaeger, Modernism, media, and propaganda: British narrative from 1900 to 1945, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 3-13. 
29
 Ibid, p. 7. 
30
 Alleyne, Global lies?, pp. 4-5. 
31
 %HQMDPLQ&RKHQµ7KH81
VGHSDUWPHQWRISXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQ¶The Public Opinion Quarterly 10, 2, 1946, p. 
146. 
32
 Alleyne, Global lies?, p. 4. 
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objective way, DYRLGLQJDQ\LQWHQWLRQRISURSDJDQGD¶33 Yet internally the lines were blurred, 
since the need to persuade as well as inform was frequently acknowledged. The terminology 
used to explain the concept was varied: a 1947 UHSRUWE\WKH:+2¶VInterim Commission 
described public information activities DVµVLPSO\DQRWKHUPHGLDRISXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶34 and a 
1955 public information study stated that whilst public information should be used to µSURPRWH
knowledge and understanding of the reasons for the Organization's existence, aims and its 
DFWLYLWLHV¶it needed to cRPELQHµVWULFWVFLHQWLILFDFFXUDF\¶ZLWKµDWWUDFWLYHDQGSRSXODU
SUHVHQWDWLRQRIPDWHULDO¶35 In the official document recording WKH:+2¶VILUVWWHQ\HDUVRI
operation, the basic function of public information was described as WRPDNHµWKHIDFWVHasily 
DYDLODEOHLQDQDSSURSULDWHDQGDFFHSWDEOHIRUP¶EHFDXVHWKH$JHQF\¶VSROLFLHVDQGSURJUDPPHV
µZLOOEHDSSUHFLDWHGRQO\LIWKHVFLHQWLILFIDFWVXQGHUO\LQJWKHPDUHPDGHZLGHO\NQRZQ¶36 Yet 
UHDGHUVKLSVKRXOGDOVREHµLQIOXHQFHG¶E\coverage that combined technical accuracy with a 
presentation sufficiently attractive to engage and hold the interest of the general public.37 
Early strategies addressed the dilemma of priming the public to be interested in the 
:+2¶VZRUNDQGDPHQDEOHWRLWVJRDOVwhilst UHPDLQLQJREMHFWLYHDQGLPSDUWLDOµ%DVLF¶SXEOLF
LQIRUPDWLRQPDWHULDOVLQFOXGHGWKRVHZKLFKZHUHµZULWWHQRUDORUYLVXDOH[SODLQLQJWKHKLVWRU\
purpose, philosophy, structure and methods of work of the Organization, and describing various 
health activiWLHVZKLFKDUHLWVFRQFHUQ¶38 For internal purposes, this documentation was divided 
LQWRµJHQHUDOGRFXPHQWDWLRQ¶DQGµVSHFLDOL]HGUHSRUWLQJ¶DOWKRXJKit was acknowledged that no 
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hard and fast distinction was possible.39 The folder titled WHO, What it Is, What it Does, How it 
Works provided essential facts about the WHO¶V operation, while booklets such as the more 
romantically titled The Lamp is Lit and Strategy for World Health presented the story of the 
agency and its practical work in a popular form. An illustration of the type of undertaking that 
resulted from these steps was the externally published 1956 book for young people, Mankind 
against the Killers, authored by James Hemming. The outcome of discussions held in 1953,40 it 
contained a foreword by Brock Chisholm and although it dealt with international health work in 
general, many sections HXORJLVHGWKH:+2¶VH[LVWHQFHChapter Fourteen, µ7KH)URQW/LQH¶
began: 
On a magnificent site near one end of the Lake of Geneva, and favoured with a glorious 
view of lofty Mont Blanc on the far side of the lake, stands a gracious and commanding 
building. It is the property of no nation, no government, no wealthy business syndicate; it 
belongs instead to everyone ± WRPDQNLQG«$OOGD\ORQJWKH3DODLVKXPVZLWKDFWLYLWy. Its 
staff, recruited from forty different nations, have a constant full schedule of work. 
Visitors of all nations and colours come and go; they bring the health problems of their 
RZQFRXQWULHVDQGWDNHDZD\WKHEHVWDGYLFHWKHZRUOGKDVWRRIIHU«41 
Whilst HQKDQFLQJWKH:+2¶VSXEOLFLPDJHZRXOGQRWEHGLVFXVVHGVHULRXVO\ until the 1970s, the 
issue was present right from its inception, evinced in the orchestration of public-oriented 
publications as well as the design and management of an emblem (comprising the symbol of the 
United Nations, surmounted by an Aesculapian staff and serpent in gold), and in the measures 
taken to safeguard against unauthorised usage of WKH:+2¶Vprofessional identity. Although 
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allusions to propaganda were publicly played down, these efforts served an important public 
relations role and helped to establish the WHO as an acknowledged authority on health matters. 
In the years before the professionalization of dedicated health correspondents, medical 
advances or disease outbreaks could be reported erroneously in the popular press.42 Whilst this 
was impossible for the WHO to control, it sought to balance the flow of information by relaying 
WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQDOYLHZSRLQWDQGPDNLQJWKHIDFWVµHDVLO\DYDLODEOHDQGLQDQDSSURSULDWHDQG
DFFHSWDEOHIRUP¶43 For health measures to have lasting value, people of all ages needed to be 
persuaded to take an intelligent and responsible part in solving their personal health problems 
and those of the community.44 7KH3,2¶VDFWLYLWLHVWKHUHIRUHVRXJKW to downplay scaremongering 
and miraculous promises, and nurture public interest in health matters. Officials recognised that 
this could not be achieved through the limited reach of WHO publications alone, and the 
stimulation of outside coverage was considered a specialist task which, in view of budgetary 
restraints, was the only hope of featuring the :+2LQWKHµH[SHQVLYH¶PHGLD. Yet professional 
reporters could not be ordered to cover the WHO, and the results of their work could not be 
guaranteed. Selected writers, journalists and producers were therefore invited to visit WKH:+2¶V 
Geneva headquarters, and travel fellowships were arranged but financed externally.45 Sensitive 
WRWKHFKDUJHRISURSDJDQGDWKH:+2¶VFRQGLWLRQZDVWKDWWKHUHVXOWLQJPDWHULDOVVhould be the 
work of these independent µwitnesses¶. In 1967 more than 2000 people visited the WHO¶V
headquarters in the orderly and impressive Palais des Nations.46  
                                                 
42
 See for instance Anne Karpf, Doctoring the media: the reporting of health and medicine, London: Routledge, 
1988. 
43
 WHO, The first ten years of the World Health Organization, p. 447. 
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To further facilitate this process, the WHO published its own public-oriented magazines, 
first the Newsletter and later World Health. Newsletter was inaugurated in September 1948 as a 
small, typewritten publication of six pages without illustrations. It rapidly underwent stylistic 
changes and a revamped Newsletter was introduced in 0DUFKµSULPDULO\IRULQGLYLGXDOV
and institutions, whether public or private, with an interest in the work of the WHO or in 
international co-RSHUDWLRQRQKHDOWKPDWWHUVJHQHUDOO\¶47 It was nevertheless welcomed by field 
staff who felt isolated from the organization¶s wider activities. Newsletter was distributed gratis 
from the WHO Headquarters and Regional Offices in response to individual requests, and by 
1955 circulated 60,000 copies.48 Newsletter¶V successor, World Health, represented a further step 
away from simply satisfying the demand for information and towards inciting and shaping 
interest. Its RIILFLDOSXUSRVHZDVWRµVWLPXODWHDQGQRXULVKLQWHUHVWLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOKHDOWKPDWWHUV
DPRQJWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶49 and therefore the criteria governing the selection of material was 
SRSXODUDSSHDODQGJHQHUDODWWUDFWLYHQHVVZKHUHWKHKXPDQLQWHUHVWDQJOHZDVXVXDOO\µSOD\HG
XS¶50   
By 1959, World Health had circulated some 80,000 copies in English, Spanish, French 
and Portuguese; a decade later this had increased to around 120,000.51 Arrangements were also 
made for issues to be translated into Russian, and the German Green Cross published a German 
edition. Appreciating that there was a realistic limit to the reach of its magazines, the WHO 
hoped that the content within would catch the eye of mainstream media editors and journalists. 
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To expedite this process, articles and photographs printed in both magazines were made freely 
available for reproductionµ$UH\RXDQHGLtor? If so has it ever struck you that some of the 
stories you read in this Newsletter would also interest the readers of your newspaper or 
periodical? You are at liberty to reprint anything appearing in these pages free of charge and 
without writing to thH:+2IRUSHUPLVVLRQ¶52 Should editors want to use the stories as a starting 
point for more in-depth features, the PIO also advertised the availability of additional text and 
illustrations upon request.  
 The key feature of such publications was their focus on photographs. In 1952 two 
hundred photographs were distributed per month in response to external requests, and escalating 
demand necessitated that the WHO acquire its own photographic laboratory the following year. 
By 1957 40,000 photographic prints were prepared for distribution, and in 1966 this number 
exceeded 50,000.53 Although photographic production was centralised in Geneva, distribution 
and the acquisition of new material relied on the assistance of information officers throughout 
the regionalised structure. The Third Annual Report to the Regional Committee for South-East 
$VLDUHFRUGHGSKRWRJUDSK\¶VSURPLQHQFHDPRQJVWSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQDFWLYLWLHVGHVFULELQJ
interest from newspapers, radio stations, health officials, UN and welfare organisations.54 In 
1956 photographic distribution was facilitated by supplying all regional information officers with 
a stock of reproductions from the Newsletter.55  
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Newsletter and World Health were visually lavish, and many issues included stories told 
primarily through photographs. The semi-UHJXODUµ:+2LQ$FWLRQ¶VHULHVillustrated health 
topics with a collection of photographs, collated from around the world. In other examples, 
µ6((1E\SKRWRJUDSKHUVRI:RUOG+HDOWKDURXQGWKHJOREH¶depicted malaria eradication with 
views selected from over 1000 photographs.56 µ/HSURV\'HP\VWLILHG¶distilled key images from 
some 25,000 photographs taken by Pierre-Andre Pittet.57 Although offered as visual evidence of 
the WHO in action, such stories frequently relied on broader narratives about the suffering of 
those affected by disease and how they were helped. To appreciate how these stories fitted in 
with the broader demands of public information, it is necessary to go beyond and behind the 
published photographs to explore the organisational culture responsible for their compilation and 
selection. 
As seen through the eyes of the WHO 
By the mid-twentieth century citizens around the world were inundated with visual 
messages about health and humanitarianism. Humanitarian organizations had increasingly 
circulated imagery in pamphlets, newsletters and publications since the turn of the twentieth 
century, with the volume intensifying in the interwar years.58 Visual messages about health 
appeared in governmentally produced education pamphlets, exhibitions and films. Health was 
also covered by illustrated magazines, where photographs were frequently the story. Life 
magazine¶VSKRWRJUDSKHUVKHOSHGWRvisualise the unfamiliar, introducing readers to new medical 
procedures as well as conditions in far corners of the globe. In conjunction with pKRWRJUDSK\¶V
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ability to display people, events, and artefacts with apparent realism, there was now a trend 
towards a more emotional, documentary photography. The Magnum collective, founded by a 
group of European photographers who were ambivalent to traditional power structures, 
emphasised ordinary people and everyday experiences through their work.59 The 1948 photo 
essay µ3HRSOHDUH3HRSOHWKH:RUOG2YHU¶, by Robert Capa, published across twelve issues of the 
Ladies Home Journal, sought to document the commonalities in human existence.60 It laid the 
groundwork for subsequent photo essays and exhibitions such as the 1955 Family of Man 
exhibition curated by Edward Steichen.61 Family of Man was based on the idea that photography 
had a unique ability to explain people to one another, demonstrated through a pictorial focus on 
significant moments of human existence such as birth, love, work and death. Subsequently 
touring the world and proving extremely popular, Family of Man provided an optimistic view of 
life and a message of hope and brotherhood. As Gautrand argues, it represented the triumph of 
KXPDQLVWSKRWRJUDSK\FKDUDFWHULVHGE\VHQVLWLYLW\WRWKHµVLPSOHMR\VRIOLIHDQHPSDWK\IRU
people in WKHVWUHHWFDXJKWLQDFWLRQ¶62 
The UN and its specialised agencies shared the view that photographs could help to foster 
attention and understanding across geographical, cultural and linguistic barriers. Public 
information officials were able to discuss planning, policy, and share common problems at 
bodies such as the Consultative Committee for Public Information and the United Nations Film 
Board.63 However, each agency honed its own systems and styles in response to individual 
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requirements. One of 81(6&2¶Vearliest missions was a photographic report on the needs of 
children in Poland, Greece, Italy, Hungary and Austria, but like the WHO, it also published a 
public-oriented magazine, the UNESCO Courier, which included arresting photography.64 A 
major function of 81,&()¶Vinformation policy was fund-raising, and the agency relied on 
photographs as evidence of its work by instructing commercial photographers to capture the 
absence of disease and hunger, as well as poignant photographs of mothers and children that 
were frequently repeated to garner public support for its initiatives.65  
The WHO¶V photographs were initially contributed by the DJHQF\¶V own field project 
workers, but were ultimately deemed to lack professional quality because they were generally 
taken by people µXQIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHPHGLDRILQIRUPDWLRQ¶66 In May 1950 a visual media expert 
was assigned to arrange photographic missions treating WKH:+2¶Vworld-wide activities, with 
the first professional mission completed in 1951.67 The WHO embedded photographers within 
the agency: the Frenchman Didier Henrioud and the Hungarian Tibor Farkas coordinated efforts 
at WHO Headquarters as well as contributing their own reports, whilst Ajaib Kochar (born in 
what had become Pakistan) worked as an Information Officer at the Regional Office for South-
East Asia.. However, the agency relied predominantly on well-regarded photographic agencies 
such as Magnum, and eminent individuals including the American Homer Page, French 
photographers Marc Riboud, Jean Philippe Charbonnier, and Eric Schwab, and Swiss 
photographer Jean Mohr. The contributions of internationally-known professionals addressed the 
difficulty of obtaining vivid first-hand accounts of field activities from technical staff, and lent 
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Newsletter and World Health cachet and authority. Because of their practical experience, they 
were also able to operate in difficult conditions and deal with taxing travel commitments.  
Photographic narratives were built up in response to the input of many individuals. Once 
each mission was authorised, photographers were supplied with background information on the 
countries and the topics in question, and met with regional WHO officials as well as specialists 
and heads of facilities. Guidelines about places to visit and what to photograph were flexible, 
since it was acknowledged that missions would have to adapt to unforeseen and unavoidable 
circumstances. Some photographers were able to follow the human drama as it unfolded. Erling 
0DQGHOPDQQ¶VGHWDLOHGPLVVLRQUHSRUWRQ6ZHGHQ¶VGUXJSUREOHPdescribed what he himself 
sawLQFOXGLQJµD\RXQJPDQWDNH>VLF@KLVLQMHFWLRQRSHQO\RQDEDQN± even [though] addicts are 
FKDVHGVWURQJO\E\WKHSROLFH¶DQGµREMHFWVWKDWWKHSROLFHKDV>VLF@IRXQGXQGHUUDLGV«IURm 
Opium and Cannabis-&DNHVWR$PSKHWDPLQH¶68 Mandelmann traced the addicts around the city 
as they evaded the police. In other cases, however, very specific instructions were supplied. For a 
mission on public health in the English city of Liverpool, a list of preferred shots and topics was 
provided to the photographer Spooner (no first name given), who was asked WRFDSWXUHWKHµOLWWOH-
known, silent, invariably unseen and un-ODXGHG¶KHDOWKVHUYLFHVRIWKHFLW\DQGVKRZWKHPHGLFDO
officer of health as DQµXQVHHQXQKHDUGRI³JXDUGLDQDQJHO´RIKHDOWK¶8QGHUthe heading 
µ+XPDQ&RQWDFW¶WKHVFULSWUHTXHVWHGDµSRVVLEO\V\PEROLFVKRWVKRZLQJSHUVRQDOFRQWDFW
between Professor Semple, MOH [Medical Officer of Health], and people he is forced to 
prosecute ± on steps of law counts (imposing building of grimy black Portland) after prosecution, 
LIVXFKDFDVHFRPHVXS«¶69 In another case, Josef %UHLWHQEDFN¶VPLVVLRQUHSRUWRQFDQFHULQ
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Japan suggests that he too was given specific requirements because he wrote that he had been 
XQDEOHWRSKRWRJUDSKIRUPHUSDWLHQWVDWKRPHµ6XFKDWKLQJWDNHVZHHNVRISUHSDUDWLRQDQG
WDONVPRUHVRLQ-DSDQWKDQHOVHZKHUHWRREWDLQSHUPLVVLRQ¶%UHLWHQEDFNLQVWHDGRIIHUHG
amateur photographs of a doctor posed with patients.70 Comprising dozens, and sometimes 
hundreds of individual shots, each mission returned a range of views that helped to set the scene, 
as well as showing actors and equipment.  
But, as Amy Lyford and Carol Payne caution, the practice of photojournalism should not 
be glorified at the expense of the deliberation and complexity of the wider picturing process.71 
All the film shot on location was assembled into contact sheets and returned to the WHO.72 The 
contact sheets enabled PIO officials to inspect and compare the work; using crosses, lines and 
circles in thick pencil they identified features which were unsuitable, areas to be cropped, and the 
shots approved for publication. For the historian this intervention provides insights into how 
visual narratives were built up and how the stipulations of public information were transferred 
via the camera and onto the page. Figures 1 and 2IURP3HWHU/DUVRQ¶VSKRWRPLVVLRQRQ
malaria in Mexico (which comprised twenty-five contact sheets in total), include photographs of 
patients, doctors, spray teams, equipment, scenes of village life, dwellings, and the local 
landscape. Figure 1 shows the malaria sprayman captured in various arrangements, including 
interacting with villagers and as seen from their perspective. The latter (marked 80 on this sheet), 
ultimately selected for publication, portrayed the sprayman as a warrior, posed in a style 
emulating a knight of old and thus implicitly endorsing WKH:+2¶Vcharacterisation of the 
malaria programme as a war on an ancient foe. LarsoQ¶Vphotograph fitted into a trope 
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established since Eric Schwab¶V 1958 photo mission to Mexico, when the suggested text argued 
that µthis is WAR, but to save lives, not to sacrifice them, and it calls for the thoroughness of 
military RUJDQL]DWLRQLQSODQQLQJDQGLQORJLVWLFV«+LJK-ranking military officers direct the 
campaign from an operational headquarters, from which they deploy their spray-teams as though 
WKH\ZHUHFRPEDWWURRSV³6XSUHPH+HDGTXDUWHUV´LV:+2¶V5HJLRQDO2IILFH«¶73 Figure 2 
displays the similar diligence applied to create a haunting photograph of one of the victims of 
this war. The contact sheet carries shots of WKHSDWLHQW¶V alert and piercing gaze, but the crosses 
show how these were rejected in favour of a sleepier vision of despair and emptiness. Her hand, 
extended limply out towards the viewer, was preferred to more detailed shots of her examination. 
7KHWH[WSDLQWHGKHUDVµWKHIDFHRIPDODULD¶WKHPDWHULDOLPSDFWRIDQµDQFLHQWFXUVH¶ZKLFK
EURXJKWµGHOLULXPGHDWKDQGHFRQRPLFUXLQ¶74 
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Figure 1: Contact Sheet from Peter Larson, Malaria, Mexico, 1968. Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds 
Photographers, WHO Archives. Copyright WHO.75 
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Figure 2: Contact Sheet from Peter Larson, Malaria, Mexico, 1968. Photographic Archives, Sub-fonds 
Photographers, WHO Archives. Copyright WHO.76 
There is little evidence of consistent attempts to enhance such views by altering them 
mechanically before publication. Although David and Rodogno cite an example in relation to a 
story about premature babies, a comparison of contact sheets with published images suggests that 
this was not an everyday practice, perhaps used when no other alternative was available or in 
response to specific time pressures.77 Published photographs tended to appear faithful to the 
originals, albeit cropped and organised in relation to text and other images. The WHO wanted 
the photographs to speak for themselves as an unembellished and authoritative record of health 
µVHHQWKURXJKWKHH\HVRIWKH:+2¶Yet whilst little mechanical manipulation took place, the 
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view was shaped in diverse ways by the instructions given to photographers, by the guides who 
accompanied them, by the people they photographed, and by the selection process after the films 
had been returned to the WHO. Indeed, as seen above, the captions and accompanying texts 
instructed the viewer in how to approach the images. The PIO was further complicit in skewing 
the picture by featuring photographs which emphasised good practice, or by including examples 
where programmes were fully operational. Ultimately, the process was geared towards the 
creation of a carefully staged drama rather than snapshots from the front lines of health. 
Though international health was played out across the world by including human faces in 
all manner of stories, often rather simple techniques were used to GLUHFWWKHUHDGHU¶VDWWHQWLRQ and 
generate both understanding and empathy. Miserable faces underscored the need to solve 
problems, and damaged ones stressed the urgency and magnitude of problems. The cover image 
chosen for a Newsletter issue on alcoholism pictured a man lying incapacitated on the ground 
(Figure 3). He looked tormented, with his mouth partially open and shadows playing across his 
deeply furrowed brow. The image was tilted at an unusual angle, stressing the intoxicating effect 
of alcohol and life spiralling out of control.78 Such constructions were meant to make viewers 
feel IRUWKHSOLJKWRIWKHµYLFWLP¶DQGSD\DWWHQWLRQWRWKHPHVVDJH. But notions of villainy, 
victimhood and deliverance were all combined in this image. In other stories the damage 
wrought by leprosy, yaws and smallpox was plain to see, but the WHO also did not shy away 
from presenting the realities of medical procedures in their ability to prevent and cure this 
damage. The lead story in the first issue of World Health, January-February 1957 (Figure 4), 
carried a close-up photograph of Adama, her eyes closed, as a small incision was made to collect 
a tissue sample to test for leprosy. At first glance, the most visible and disturbing sight is the 
LPSOHPHQWSRLVHGWREUHDN$GDPD¶VVNLQDOWKRXJKthis is intended to assure the reader that 
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timely action has saved her from further disfigurement since further down the page she is shown 
on her way to receive treatment.   
 
28 
 
Figure 3: WHO Newsletter, July-August 1954, front cover. Copyright WHO.79 
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Figure 4: World Health, January-February 1957, front cover. Copyright WHO.80 
In contrast, happy and hopeful faces were used to show problems being resolved, to 
inspire further action, and to approve the work of the WHO. But this went beyond µbefore and 
after¶ narratives that showed damaged faces and healed ones following treatment. The innocent 
faces of children, or the arresting faces of young women drawn from countries around the world 
were used to capture WKHYLHZHU¶VLQWHUHVWEXWWKLVZDVnot always done to inspire pity, concern 
or relief. Optimism was also a strong feature: Maria Luisa µVKRZHGWKHZD\¶ on the cover of a 
1961 special issue on health in the Americas (Figure 5). In looking upwards and to a fixed point 
in the distance, she appears to suggest that although still some way off, the way forward 
represented a bright and alluring prospect. Indeed, one might read her expression as anywhere 
between dreamlike and fixated on this idea of hope. Although her name is given, and facial 
features and expression are clearly visible, the blurring of the edges of Maria Luisa¶Vface omits 
contextualising information such as hairstyle, clothing or location, giving the impression of an 
every-person. This cover photograph WHVWLILHVWRWKH:+2¶Vpreoccupation with human interest, 
but also its desire to move beyond the medicalised gaze and on to universally-felt emotions of 
determination, hope and happiness.  
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Figure 5: World Health, Special Issue: The Americas, September-October 1961. Copyright WHO.81 
Whilst the tale of victory has been identified as an important pillar of the :+2¶VYLVXDO
politics,82 equally important was visualising the work undertaken to achieve this in photo stories 
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that described searching, hunting and scouring. The images were intended to support the notion 
that all possible efforts were being marshalled to combat and overcome the causes of ill health. 
Such efforts could be initiated, for instance, by innovative technology and scientific 
breakthroughs, with reportage taking place in the laboratory and the operating theatre where the 
actors searched for answers and pursued microscopic enemies. In the 1963 IHDWXUHµ7KH
8QNQRZQ*XDUGLDQ$QJHOV+DYH)DFHV¶ (Figure 6), the photographs showed public health 
officials examining hotels, as well as utensils and foodstuffs. Again, the viewer is invited to 
scrutinise their faces, and whilst comparatively stoic, their expressions of concentration 
underscored the diligence and expertise necessary to prevent people falling ill.83 World Health 
Jan-Feb 1962 carried a story of a Hong Kong opium hunt in which the photographs, by the 
Hungarian Paul Almasy, depicted policemen and specially trained dogs searching the streets for 
drug peddlers. One even showed a pursuit in progress across the roofs of the town as smokers 
escaped through a window.84 But the same point was made in relation to the dedication to the 
betterment of mankind which was held to thrive in every human, regardless of their location or 
background. The impression of a pursuit added drama and constituted an important narrative 
steppLQJVWRQHLQUHODWLRQWRWKH:+2¶V µbefore and after¶ photographs, which showed problems 
and resolutions. But they also added weight to the implication that people should maintain their 
vigilance in the face of threats to public health. 
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Figure 6: Detail IURPµThe Unknown Guardian Angels Have Faces¶ photostory, pages 48-49, World Health, 
September-October 1963. Copyright WHO.85 
 
Although human actors were privileged in the drama of international health, place and 
location played an important role in structuring and staging the photographic performance. In 
depicting remote rural areas, readers were asked to consider the difficulties of staying healthy in 
inaccessible places rarely reached by the modern world. However, such landscapes were also 
presented as stunningly beautiful in their loneliness, and this aspect was regularly emphasised in 
World Health. They were used to WHPSWWKHUHDGHU¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHVHP\VWHULRXVSODFHVDUWLFOHV 
commonly began with long descriptions about unusual fauna and flora), and add a sense of 
adventure to delivering health in these areas. They were similarly constructed with an eye to 
FRQYH\LQJWKHµULJKW¶PHVVDJHHYHQwhen this entailed re-enactment: when photographing a 
µstranded¶ jeep to illustrate the difficulties of communication, a group of local children rushed to 
the rescue believing the jeep to be in genuine difficulty.86 In contrast, whilst cities generally 
benefitted from better access to health services, they were paradoxically represented as highly 
dangerous places. Hazards lurked around many corners, in the shape of traffic accidents, 
inadequate sanitation, but also in regard to modern living with addiction to alcohol and drugs as 
seen in the example above. Implicit in the WHO¶VSXEOLFDWLRQVwas the message that although 
people were people the world over they were also specifically located and subject to the 
problems associated with different environments.  
It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the myriad ways in which location was used, 
but it is worth considering some examples to demonstrate that a variety of staging devices were 
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used to draw readers to certain conclusions. Whether rural or urban, the family home was 
presented at the heart of human health. It was a setting frequently used to display the mother and 
child relationship emphasised by other organisations such as UNICEF. Workplaces, often 
depicting agricultural or factory work, were presented both as a site of potential danger from 
industrial accidents or respiratory disorders, but also as an element in the narrative of resolution, 
whereby returning to work signified productive life recommencing after illness had successfully 
been overcome. The setting of the hospital or the laboratory was used in diverse ways, and 
conformed to the wider representation of places where healing and discovery took place. Finally, 
the administrative buildings of WHO were shown as orderly, tranquil and purposeful centres 
where matters were resolved and a healthier future mapped out.  
Sometimes the WHO persisted with a particular image which, despite inaccuracies, was 
thought to capture the public imagination. This was the case in establishing the idea of a military 
operation against malaria. Following (ULF6FKZDE¶Vphoto-story on the Mexican 
eradication effort, the WHO was subsequently advised that the participation of army personnel 
was solely under Ministry of Public Health control, and asked to avoid any further confusion.87 
+RZHYHUDV/DUVRQ¶VSKRWRJUDSKVused some years later demonstrate, the WHO continued to 
convey the impression that the Mexican military was involved. Certain photographs were reused 
in later issues and other publications, sometimes in connection with topics they were not 
originally intended to illustrate, albeit cropped differently or accompanied by reworked captions. 
This emphasises that pKRWRJUDSK\¶VYDOXHfor public information purposes lay not simply in 
recording situations realistically and keeping the public informed, but to stimulate and direct 
popular opinion. A good picture was perennially useful, and b\WKHODWHVWKH:+2¶VFHQWUDO
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photo library contained over 15000 registered negatives. The WHO believed it to be the world's 
most extensive collection of pictures on the situation of international health, capable of 
illustrating health activities and achievements in almost any area of the world.88 Different 
influences and specific styles were evident in every photograph, but the WHO ultimately 
preferred those which were eye-catching, and that supported a narrative where µVcientific 
DFFXUDF\¶Zas arguably relegated behind µDWWUDFWLYHDQGSRSXODU¶in the procurement and 
selection process. 7KHSKRWRJUDSKVZHUHUHTXLUHGWRGRPXFKPRUHWKDQPDNHWKH:+2¶VZRUN
visible, and the photographer was less a witness and more a storyteller. 
The Problems of Public Information  
The WHO periodically evaluated public information work, but success was difficult to 
determine explicitly. The circulation of Newsletter and then World Health grew throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, and the supply of other written and visual material was commonly exhausted 
within months of release. These accomplishments were enthusiastically announced in annual 
reports, although it was acknowledged that numbers alone did not represent a valid criterion for 
assessing the true effectiveness of the work, which was cumulative and dependant on sustained 
efforts.89 Nevertheless, the WHO increasingly asked whether public information expenditure 
represented good value, and what more could be done to meet its constitutional obligations. It 
was probably sensitised to these issues because of early failures and missed opportunities. 
Although the PIO was established to inform the greatest number of people about the DJHQF\¶V 
work, it was ironically unable to satisfy the initial levels of interest in the agency. In the 1947 the 
Interim Commission highlighted the small provision for PIO staff compared with other UN 
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agencies (two officials compared with twenty-four at the Food and Agriculture Organization and 
fifteen at UNESCO), and advised creating two more permanent posts.90 But subsequent reports 
noted that not only was the PIO unable to satisfy demand, it had to turn down requests for news 
items and photographs from popular science magazines, general health and paramedical 
publications, yearbooks, encyclopaedias, and handbooks on international organizations. The 
annual report for 1950 stressed that interest in the work of the WHO was µalmost everywhere 
greater than are the possibilities of VXSSO\LQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWLW¶.91 Only in 1953 was it 
possible to fulfil the majority of requests. This inability to capitalise on early interest also fuelled 
the conviction that the WHO could not hope to spread evidence of its existence independently, 
but needed to rely on other media outlets to cover the WHO on its behalf. 
With the limited resources at its disposal the WHO was similarly unable to provide 
translations to meet demand. It therefore depended on local efforts: in 1953 the Regional 
Committee for the Western Pacific recommended that each member state take steps first, to 
reproduce and distribute, information concerning the work of the WHO µRQWKHZLGHVWSRVVLEOH
VFDOH¶; second, to establish a liaison service; and third, to teach the aims and activities of the 
WHO to schoolchildren.92 Concluding that public information activities should be intensified, 
the Eighth World Health Assembly, the main decision-making body of WHO, made a similar 
request to member governments to ask for cooperation in making the :+2¶VZRUNlimitations 
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and challenges widely known.93 As new nations joined the UN in the late 1950s they were 
approached by the WHO, which emphasised that they should allocate all necessary resources to 
help realize the objectives of the agency.  
As mentioned above, the WHO hoped to attract external coverage through its magazines, 
and later in the 1960s the agency also succeeded in placing its photographs in United Press 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO¶V(8523IX service, which served Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Peru, Scandinavia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab 
Republic and the United States of America.94 These efforts met with some success: a report on 
public information projects undertaken between November 1953 and June 1954 recorded that the 
popular French magazine Elle, and other illustrated periodicals in Switzerland, England and 
Germany, had devoted long stories to the WHO. The Regional Offices worked to inspire 
international coverage by arranging for material to be placed in local picture magazines.95 In 
1955 it was reported that a µpopular health magazine¶ with a circulation of 300,000 had reprinted 
the entire July-August 1954 issue of Newsletter.96 In 1964 the Oxford Committee for Famine 
Relief (OXFAM) used WHO photographs in its exKLELWLRQµ3DUWQHUVLQ3URJUHVV¶ and a dozen 
magazines published WKHµ0DVNRI0HQLQJLWLV¶SKRWRJUDSKVHULHV which illustrated a WHO-
assisted project on cerebrospinal meningitis control in Niger.97 
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Life and Life International magazine used WHO photographs in several stories about the 
agency, like the ten-page article in August 1958 that featured stories on µ$3ROLR%R\RQ+LV
)HHW¶µ0DODULD0HQDFH7RSV$OO2WKHUV¶DQGµ$:RUOG:DURQ'LVHDVH¶98 Although copyright 
freedom meant there was no need to attribute the accompany images to the WHO, most would 
have been familiar to regular readers of the Newsletter. Coverage of the WHO in The Rotarian, 
the official magazine of Rotary International, was more embellished. The article µPLOOLRQ
&KLOGUHQ,&DQ¶W)RUJHW¶ emphasised the WHO as a world good, outlining the health problems 
facing children globallyDQGWKH:+2¶Vrole in solving them. The article featured (ULF6FKZDE¶V
photographs of Ede Nwaegbo before and after his treatment for yaws. (GH¶VVWRU\ was relayed in 
the following wordsµ«$\HDURUVRDJRKHJRW\DZV«DQGKLVIDFHORRNHGOLNHWKLVOHIW(YHQ
his mother could barely stand the sight of him. Then a WHO team came along and gave him a 
VKRWRISHQLFLOOLQ7HQGD\VODWHUKHORRNHGOLNHWKLVULJKW7RGD\KH¶VDVURXQGVPRRWKDQG
lovable as any 5-year-ROG+LVQHZOHDVHRQOLIHFRVWWKHHTXLYDOHQWRIRQH86'ROODU¶ The 
article concluded b\SURFODLPLQJµWKLVZRUNLVPRQXPHQWDODQGZHOOZRUWKWKHPLOOLRQVRI
dollars that WHO and UNICEF expend¶.99 Whether the WHO was pleased with such brazen 
positivity, or feared it more akin to propaganda, is not recorded in the annual reports. But like the 
UN, the WHO likely considered that coverage of its activities in well-regarded and prestigious 
outlets helped to enhance its reputation and promote the newsworthy aspects of the agency.100  
Occasionally, however, the use of WHO photographs by external publications caused 
controversy. An illustrative case occurred after a 1970 shoot on cancer in Kenya. Some months 
after $OPDV\¶V photographs were published in World Health, the photo editor, Tibor Farkas, 
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received a letter from the medical centre involved in the reportage. The director said that he had 
been shocked to see his photographs reproduced in the Medical Tribune, because they presented 
µDFRQIXVHGDQGFRPSOHWHO\HUURQHRXVSLFWXUHRIRXUDIODWR[LQDQGOLYHUFDQFHUSURJUDPPH¶ 
which could, he claimed, have political and social repercussions.101 Such was the :+2¶V
reputation that LQFOXVLRQRIPDWHULDOFUHGLWHGµ:+2¶FRXOGEHWDNHQDVWDFLWHQGRUVHPHQWHYHQLI
this was not the intention. In instances like this, however, the WHO had no control over the 
editorial decisions of independent publications and could not ask each story to be sent to the 
agency to be proofed. Distributing material on a large scale and encouraging outside publication 
was a key public information strategy. 
In other instances, however, the WHO sternly protected its identity and reputation. This is 
evident in the Brando case, and in the efforts to guard against the unauthorised use of the WHO 
name and emblem.102 Its reports might appear outward-looking, but in certain cases the WHO 
remained extremely cautious about its global representation. Although the agency would have 
DJUHHGZLWKWKH81¶VEURDGLGHDVDQGJRDOVUHJDUGLQJSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQLWwas more reticent 
regarding the specific ways through which these aims could be achieved&LQHPD¶VSRSXODULW\
made it a natural area of interest for the UN, and the film board was envisaged as a body which 
would not only make its own newsreels and documentaries, but also stimulate outside film 
SURGXFWLRQRQWKH81DQGLWVDJHQFLHV¶DFWLYLWLHV as well.103 Jean Benoit-Levy, head of UN film 
activities, and Benjamin Cohen believed that if studios could be convinced to feature the UN, 
this would help to condition audiences to accept the organization as part of their daily lives and 
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associate it favourably with high purposes. If successful, this would garner millions of dollars' 
worth of publicity for the price of one man's time and wages.104 The former head of the 
UNESCO Film Section in Paris, Mogens Skot-Hansen, was selected to supply free-lance writers 
with story ideas and material and information on the UN and its agencies.105 But at a meeting in 
July 1951, Joseph Handler, the Head of the WHO¶V PIO reported that although Skot-Hansen had 
performed an excellent job on behalf of the UN, judgement and sometimes restraint should still 
be exercised in approving Hollywood scripts containing UN references.106 This attitude helps 
explain why the Brando film stalled, despite the fact that it represented precisely the kind of 
opportunity that Skot-Hansen had been tasked with securing.  
If public information was to have any value and be acknowledged as truthful and 
authoritative, the agency needed to safeguard its reputation by preventing the unauthorized use of 
its image. A film screened before WHO officials in January 1963 was rejected, owing to the 
unsuitable treatment of venereal disease and prostitution. It was decided that the WHO could not 
be associated with the film in any way, and that references to the WHO name, buildings and 
activities should be removed. Yet an edited version of the same film was again deemed 
unacceptable because it seemed to suggest that the characters were connected with WHO, a 
suggestion reinforced by the fact that WHO was mentioned in the acknowledgements and 
commentary. A recall and edit was promised, and the existing footage was constantly monitored 
to ascertain whether any illicit copies remained in circulation. The agency even used its legal 
office to contact critics who had reviewed the film for newspapers.107 This episode again 
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demonstrates the frequently fine line in the demands placed on public information officials as 
they sought to promote their activities but guard against questionable usage of the WHO¶V 
association. But it also suggests the presence of companies and individuals that accepted the 
credibility and authority of WHO (DVVWDWHGLQWKHDJHQF\¶VRZQSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQPDWHULDOV), 
but used this connection in ways that could be inappropriate or controversial. 
Judging the effect of public information work on the intended audience was harder. The 
records do not suggest that a comprehensive answer was ever obtained, although the WHO had a 
reasonably good idea of who it wanted to target and who it was reaching, even recording the 
names and addresses of subscribers to its publications. The PIO initially employed a press 
cutting service, covering 6ZLW]HUODQGµFHUWDLQDUHDVRI(XURSH¶DQGµDIHZnon-European 
FHQWUHV¶ZKLFKGHOLYHUHGVRPHWRFOLSSLQJVIURPQHZVSDSHUVDQGSeriodicals.108 In 
1968 press cuttings received from µall parts of the world¶ indicated widespread interest in that 
\HDU¶VWorld Health Assembly, as well as topics including cancer, cardiovascular diseases, 
smallpox eradication, the growing accident rate, family planning, and the shortage of medical 
and nursing personnel.109 But the same sources also revealed disappointments, such as poor press 
coverage of the 1959 world malaria eradication campaign.110 Internal reports suggest that the 
WHO was keen to learn from such failures and renegotiate its appeal: the µFRQVWDQWSUREOHP¶of 
interesting the press in positive health achievements rather than sensational or controversial 
topics led the PIO to change the presentation of certain press releases by including more 
background information and lively examples. It was subsequently noted that the strategy resulted 
                                                 
108
 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United 
Nations, 1948, pp. 37-38. 
109
 WHO, The second ten years of the World Health Organization, pp. 291-92. 
110
 WHO, Work of WHO: annual report of the Director-General to the World Health Assembly and to the United 
Nations, 1959, WHO: Geneva, 1960, p. 50. http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/85722 (consulted 20 October 
2017). 
42 
 
in increased interest, although quite how this was demonstrated is unclear.111 It also remained 
difficult to estimate the size of the audience reached by WHO information, and even harder to 
assess the extent to which public attitudes were changed. 
There are also very few opportunities to assess how WKH:+2¶VSKRWRJUDSKVZHUH
viewed by the public at large, although a photography competition published in World Health of 
May 1971 provides some telling insights. The front cover featured nineteen photographs with a 
banner title encouraging readers to µ/RRNcDUHIXOO\DWWKLVFRYHULWPD\ZLQ\RXDSUL]H¶They 
were asked to identify the health activity illustrated in each of the photographs, with bonus points 
given for naming the country. The top prizes ranged from a camera, transistor radio and 
wristwatch, down to WHO albums, keychains and subscriptions to World Health. The 
competition required close scrutiny of the photographs, as well as a familiarity with the topics 
and stylistic conventions in the publication. Although the winners came close, none of the 
entrants correctly identified all nineteen photographs. This suggests that whilst people were 
interested in the photos and found them visually intriguing, they had not taken note of the 
particular medical procedures or the geographic location. Educated to see emotions and shared 
problems, photographs were less useful in engaging people as informative indicators about 
particular health situations in specific countries. 
 Conclusions    
This article sought to understand the formulation of the WHO¶VSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQ
programmes and its impact and on subsequent visual campaigns. 7KHVXFFHVVRIWKH:+2¶V
mission was thought to depend on its ability to communicate; as a multifaceted international 
organisation with multiple regional variations and programmes to consider, the new agency 
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aimed to establish its identity, authority, and build a rapport with the world public. In doing so, 
its communications went beyond keeping the public conversant with the international health 
situation and sought to create enthusiasm and interest in the WHO¶V activities. $VWKH81¶V
incursions into Hollywood show, this was a key period in working international organisations 
into the everyday lives of citizens around the world. However, in an increasingly crowded mass 
media landscape, many organisations competed for public attention.  
Control of the WHO¶V identity was equally essential, and by the time that the Brando film 
proposal was being seriously discussed the WHO was increasingly nervous about relinquishing 
control over its messages, and potential damage to its carefully crafted public image. Whilst the 
agency competed for attention it did not do so indiscriminately. Health was of interest to all 
peoples, but required sensitive treatment if new measures were to have any chance of success. 
The importance of this can be seen in the complementary drive to monitor the performance of 
campaigns and evaluate impact, as well as in the increasing reliance on media professionals 
rather than field workers with an amateur interest in the subject.  
This article has nevertheless shown how and where the boundaries were pushed. 
Photography was emotional; mission reports and correspondence with photographers 
demonstrates that photo stories were the result of a painstaking process and the work of many 
officials. Public information was LQWHQGHGWREXLOGXSDµZRUOGKHDOWK-FRQVFLRXV¶EXWit is unclear 
whether those responsible were concerned that their efforts created visual vocabularies which 
were stereotyped, or whether there was an awareness of contemporary phenomena akin to 
µFRPSDVVLRQIDWLJXH¶.112 In evaluating programmes, the :+2¶VUHFRUGVDUHXOWLPDWHO\VLOHQWRQ
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these issues, even though the annual reports do record instances where officials were dissatisfied 
by the response to certain campaigns. It is quite possible that some adverse aspects were not fully 
recognised until later on when more serious attempts were made to qualitatively evaluate public 
information work. For instance, media enquiries around the delivery of primary health care 
revealed how inured people had become to promises of betterment, but the reader experience is, 
on the whole, difficult to retrace.   
Whilst in the 1950s and 1960s the WHO released material in the hope that it would be 
sufficiently attractive enough to be picked up, it subsequently acknowledged that a vertical 
approach to public information was insufficient, and that local communities and journalists 
needed to be involved in the process. Information was not necessarily imparted correctly or 
understood automatically as a result of press releases.113 The WHO also recognised that 
communications technology worked at different pitches around the world, and a one-size-fits-all 
approach was ineffective. New approaches and technologies led to questioning of how to best 
SXEOLFLVHWKH:+2¶VZRUNDQGDGGUHVVFULWLFLVPVWhe popularity of television had, for instance, 
meant the decline of many mass-circulation illustrated magazines.114 Image management took on 
renewed importance in the late 1970s and 1980s, with JUHDWHUTXHVWLRQLQJRIWKH:+2¶V
authority and capabilities, especially when it experienced financial instability as a result of zero 
nominal growth and the failure of some countries to pay their full assessed contributions.115 As a 
result, public information activities were reduced between 1976 and 1979 with some elements 
eliminated altogether: exhibitions would only be issued if funding was found through extra-
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budgetary resources. The complete curtailment of the free distribution of photographs marked a 
QHZHPEDWWOHGHUDRIPHGLDHQJDJHPHQWDQGFUDIWLQJ:+2¶VSXEOLFSHUVRQD116  
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